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In recent years a voluminous literature relying on cross-national data sets and linear-regression
analysis has confidently drawn major inferences about the causes of economic growth. This
literature has not been confined to purely academic debates: its results have been used
widely to influence economic policies in developing countries.
But policymakers must be cautious in interpreting the results of these exercises.
They are often clouded by serious methodological problems that are seldom
discussed transparently. The purpose of this Policy Research Brief is to explore the
limitations of the current growth-regression approach to formulating policies in
the real world and pose some promising alternatives.
I. Causality, Measurement and Robustness:
The Usual Suspects
Suppose a policymaker is deciding whether to increase her country’s exposure to
international trade. A new report comes out filled with growth-regression exercises
that attribute a significant increase in growth to trade liberalization. Prominent in
the report are a set of visually impressive scatter plots on which a regression line is
superimposed in order to show that more open economies have higher growth
rates. How should this information affect her decision?
The first question to ask is whether the graph would not make more sense with the axes inverted. In other words, does it make at
least as much sense to argue that faster growth generates more trade openness? For example, if liberalization is easier to push forward
politically in the midst of an economic expansion, one would expect to see a positive association between trade and growth even if
trade itself is not the cause.
But there are more subtle reasons why correlation need not imply causation. Both growth and trade could be caused by a third factor.
Imagine that an economy is benefiting from the effects of educational reforms that have made its labour force more productive. The
resulting increase in competitiveness implies that the economy is able to both export more and produce more, therefore experiencing
higher growth and increased trade at the same time. But this coincidence does not imply that increasing trade raises growth.
A second question to ask about the regression analysis is whether the way that the variables are measured corresponds to the policy
tools that the country is considering to use. For example, much of the trade-growth literature uses the trade share (the ratio of imports
plus exports to GDP) as its measure of openness, even though policymakers are more interested in the effect of lowering policy
barriers that they actually control—such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
Figure 1 (next page) shows that the choice of indicator makes a huge difference in this case: while there is a positive relationship
between growth and trade shares (the upward sloping line in the left panel), there is virtually no relationship between growth and
tariffs (the horizontal line in the right panel).
A third question to ask about regression analysis is whether the result is just a quirk of either the sample or the selection of other
variables in the regression. In data sets spanning fewer than 100 countries, the decision to exclude or include a particular set of
countries can make a big difference. So does including or omitting relevant variables from the analysis. In other words, the results
do not remain unaltered, ‘robust’, in response to changing the sample or adding variables.
Suppose, for example, that countries tend to liberalize trade at the same time that they carry out macroeconomic stabilization.
Then the results of a regression showing a trade-growth association might hinge on whether the regression in question includes
controls for such stabilization. If they are not included, the estimated effect of trade liberalization could simply be reflecting effects
due to macroeconomic reforms.
The academic growth literature has made some reasonable attempts to deal with these issues, such as using instrumental variables to
eliminate the possibility of reverse causation. Nevertheless, most growth-regression exercises fail to seriously address issues of
causality, measurement and robustness. This might be due, in part, to the relative ease with which very simple analyses can be
carried out with ready-made data sets. It might also be due to the inherent appeal of finding ‘causes’ of growth that can serve as
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In a world in which even well-trained academics have
trouble sorting out informative results from spurious ones,
policymakers are well-advised to be extremely cautious about
believing overarching conclusions about development policy
based on the results of current growth analyses. While problems
of causation, measurement and robustness plague just about
any regression exercise, they are particularly serious in linear
growth regressions. Studies of economic growth rely on a small
number of countries—commonly 70-100—so small clusters or
even single countries can have marked effects on the results.
Also, instrumental variables are very difficult to find at the
national level where multiple channels of causation are likely to
operate. Moreover, useful methods available to microeconomic
researchers—such as designing controlled experiments—are
neither feasible nor desirable at the national level.
II.  What If the World Isn’t Flat?
Dealing with Real World Complexity
Some methodological problems are unique to studies
of economic growth. The foremost problem is dealing with real
world complexity. The workhorse growth regression embodies
a particular vision of the world that assumes, implicitly, that the
same model of growth is true for all countries.
A linear growth regression, the standard in applied research,
goes even further: it assumes that a very simple linear model
is true for all countries. But a linear relationship might not
apply in many cases. An example would be a country in which
moderate trade protection would increase economic growth
but closing off its economy completely to international trade
would spell economic disaster.
Linear growth regressions imply that the effect of increasing the
value of the independent variable would be the same for all
countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other
variables. This is what it means to fit a straight line to such a
data set (such as in Figure 1). Therefore, an increase of the tariff
rate from 0 to 10 percent is presumed to generate the same
change in the growth rate as a change from 90 to 100 percent.
Furthermore, the change from 0 to 10 percent is assumed to
have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a
primary-resource exporter as in a manufactures exporter, and
in a country with well-developed institutions as in a country
with underdeveloped institutions.
To be fair, some growth researchers have attempted to
deal with these problems by slightly relaxing the linear
framework. A common approach is to introduce a quadratic
or multiplicative term in order to capture, respectively,
nonlinearities and interactions among variables. However, this
approach, while increasingly popular, is ill-suited to handling
real-world complexity. Growth can have complex relationships
with a number of different variables, rather than just one or two.
One might react to this criticism by noting that a regression
is really no more than an approximation of the truth, and so it is
necessarily less complex. Nevertheless, some approximations
are better than others. And, indeed, some can be quite bad.
An extensive econometrics literature has established that a
linear regression cannot generally be expected to provide a
good approximation of an unknown non-linear function. In
recent research, I have carried out simulations that show that
the resulting bias can be quite large, often leading to gross
mis-estimates of the actual effect (see Rodríguez 2007).
III.  Policymaking under Radical Uncertainty
Designing a growth strategy is somewhat like getting to the
peak of a mountain that is covered by clouds. You cannot see
where the peak is. You might not even know the direction in
which to go. All you know is that if you go up, there is some
probability that you are ascending the peak.
Of course, if you have a good map and a compass, navigating
can be easier. And if you have a GPS system, it would literally be
just a walk in the park. Doing growth empirics is essentially a
project that constructs a map. But the linear growth regression
is tantamount to trying to draw the map assuming that the
mountain is shaped like a pyramid.
What do you do then if you do not have a map? Or your map is
not very good? The simple answer is that instead of trying to
use global information on where the mountain peak is
located, you will have to intensively use local information
in order to make reasonable inferences about how to reach
the peak. You will try to infer where you are from careful
observation of the vegetation, the terrain, the flow of rivers,
and just about any other observable characteristic that allows
you to make progress.
Conceptually, the same principles can be applied to economic
growth. Research by Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik and
Andrés Velasco of Harvard University (2004) has considered the
problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical
uncertainty’ about any generalized growth effects. They call their
method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to
the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the
causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every
country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful.
The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete
environment about the specific binding constraints on growth.
The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions
that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the
problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-
specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem
that you are interested in addressing as well as the signals that
the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the
cause of that problem.
The method is illustrated in Figure 2 for an economy that
suffers from signs of low investment and entrepreneurship.
The first question to ask is whether this is due to unattractive
returns on investment or very costly credit. If the latter were
the cause, there should be signs of high costs of finance.
If, in contrast, returns were not attractive, you need to know
whether the actual rates of return are low or investors are not
certain about retaining (appropriating) the returns from their
activity. If there is ‘low appropriability’, this might be due, in
turn, to either market failures or government failures.
Carrying out a complete growth diagnostics requires that
you go down the appropriate branches of the tree of possible
explanations illustrated in Figure 2. The process goes on until3
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Figure 2
The Growth Dianostics Methodology
Source: Hausmann, Rodrik. and Velasco (2004).
one identifies the constraints that, when loosened, are likely to
generate the highest increase in growth.
Hausmann and Rodrik (2005) provide an example of applying
growth diagnostics to El Salvador. The country is a puzzling
case for some analysts since it has strictly followed the
recommendations of the Washington Consensus yet its
growth experience has been lacklustre, at best.
We can start out by asking whether this outcome can be
explained as a result of constraints on international borrowing.
If this were the case, there would be a high cost of external
finance. But the country enjoys investment-grade credit rating,
has an external debt to GDP ratio of less than 30 per cent and
has had balance of payments deficits of less than two per cent
of GDP in the last five years.
Instead, the problem appears to be due to low returns to
investment. But most of the standard explanations for these
low returns can be discounted in El Salvador: it does not have
high taxes, costly labour restrictions or insecure property
rights.  Hausmann and Rodrik argue instead that El Salvador
shows many signs of coordination failures in its export
sectors—a problem that can be addressed through active
government policies to support the development of new
exportable products.
Such decision-making under ‘radical uncertainty’ is surely
much more difficult than operating on the illusion that ‘one
size fits all’. But real-world experience suggests that one
should be very sceptical about such a rigid approach to
policymaking. The experience of the 1990s, when the
overwhelming majority of developing countries followed
some variant of  the Washington Consensus, produced
numerous examples of staggering gaps between the
predicted effects and the actual results
A widely disseminated recent report by the World Bank,
entitled Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning From a Decade
of Reforms, carries out an in-depth analysis of country
experiences with market reforms and reaches the sobering
conclusion that “different polices can yield the same result,
and the same policy can yield different results, depending
on country institutional contexts and underlying growth
strategies” (World Bank 2005, p. 12).
IV. Drawing Maps and Charts in a Complex World
Obviously, a good map would be very useful in trying to
reach the peak of our mountain. Even though it could well
be imprecise, it should be able to provide us with some
valuable information to complement our local knowledge
and experimentation. The problem is not with the idea of
making a map; it is with our methods of mapmaking.
The design of growth strategies takes place in a context of
uncertainty about the multiple relationships among potential
causes, intermediate channels and the final outcome of
economic growth. Policymakers will generally have a clear
idea of their destination but vaguer notions of the appropriate
levers to pull to start moving there.  In the words of a former
Venezuelan minister of industry,
“Inducing large-scale social changes through deliberate policy
reforms is akin to walking through a constantly shifting maze filled
with menacing beasts. When confronted, some of these monsters turn
out to be harmless—paper tigers—while others are deadly minotaurs”
(Naim 1993, p. 13).
If we want to build a map of these complex relationships, we
can either recognize the uncertainty inherent in mapmaking
or try to use a priori beliefs to give the map an illusory
structure. The latter approach was taken by cartographers
in the fifteenth century, and produced quite a few maps that
predicted that you would fall off a cliff once you reached
the edges of the known world.
How do we take full account of existing uncertainty in our
attempt to understand the development process? A whole
field of econometric theory is devoted to estimating
relationships when we have no prior knowledge about
their underlying forms. This field, known as nonparametric
econometrics, has made significant advances in the past two
decades. Its key idea is that instead of embracing a priori
assumptions about the relationships among potential
explanatory variables, we should “let the data speak”
as much as possible about them.
A commonly mentioned drawback of nonparametric
econometrics is that it requires considerable amounts of data
in order to reasonably estimate the underlying functions. But,
just as in mapmaking, some inferences require a lot of data
while others do not. A precise map of the world requires
painstaking and exhaustive surveying. But you can safely
reject the general hypothesis that the world is round by
circumnavigating it only once.
In a recent paper (Rodríguez 2007), I have used methods of
nonparametric econometrics to understand the potential
effects of different components of reform strategies on
economic growth. The results, some of which are contained
in Table 1 on the next page, capture only some very general
features of a reality that is, in essence, very complex.
The analysis distinguishes among three types of reforms:
policy, institutional and structural. Policy instruments, such as
tariffs, exchange rates and the money supply, are the components
of an economic strategy that tend to be under the control of
the government. Institutional reforms are more complex,
requiring concerted action by governments and social forces
to reform key aspects of the rules of the game under which
societies operate. Structural reforms are associated with the
achievement of medium- to long-term transformations
in the economic organization of societies.
The table presents the average growth effect of completely
reforming a particular dimension of a country’s policy,
institutional or structural environment, and contrasts theInternational Poverty Centre
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Table 1
Growth Effects of Reforms, Linear and
Nonparametric Estimates
Source: Rodríguez (2007). Bold-faced font indicates significant coefficient at 5%.
Nonparametric estimate refers to the average partial derivative.
Policy Variables
Inflation -1.3% -0.3%
Black Market Premium -1.6% -0.3%
Government Consumption -1.8% -0.7%
Tariff Rate  1.7% -0.1%
Policy Index -1.8%  0.4%
Institutional Variables
Rule of Law  1.0%  0.6%
Political Stability  2.3%  1.9%
Economic Freedom Index  3.5%  1.6%
Index of Government Effectiveness  3.5%  1.2%
Institutions Index  3.4%  1.0%
Structural Variables
Non-Primary Exports  0.3%  1.0%
Urbanization Rate  1.2%  1.4%
Life Expectancy  4.0%  1.4%
Liquid Liabilities/GDP  2.4%  2.1%





results from an ordinary linear growth regression with those
from a nonparametric method. The latter approach allows
for the variables in question to affect growth through an
unknown function.
Several results are apparent from the table. One is that standard
growth regressions often tend to exaggerate the effects of
changes in explanatory variables in comparison to the more
flexible nonparametric estimate. The average absolute value
of the effects in Table 1 is more than twice as large for the linear
regression as for the nonparametric one. But this tendency is not
uniform across different types of explanatory variables.
The results show that the relative importance of different
variables changes dramatically when we shift from the
restrictive linear approach to the more flexible nonparametric
approach. Policy variables are much less significant while
structural variables are much more significant in accounting
for changes in growth. Institutional variables also become
somewhat more significant.
The increased relevance of structural and institutional variables
and the diminished importance of policy variables are not
surprising. Because linear regression tries to fit all countries into
the same mould,  it necessarily tends to give added weight to
outliers—observations that exhibit very atypical patterns. Since
the data on policies are more variable, perhaps because they are
easier to change than institutions or economic structure, they are
more prone to produce this distortion.
Our evidence can be read as putting forward a rationale for
concentrating on deep, long-run structural and institutional
reforms instead of the easier-to-change macroeconomic policies
that tended to be emphasized in the Washington Consensus
strategies of the 1990s. Certainly, the results suggest that a more
nuanced view of economic reforms, in which long-run reforms
are much more vital than policy changes, goes hand in hand with
a more flexible view of how to interpret the growth evidence.
V.  Concluding Remarks
Many of the results from cross-country regressions are severely
limited by methodological problems, ranging from issues of
causality, measurement and robustness to deeper problems
inherent in a one-size-fits-all model that cannot capture the
real-world complexity of the development process.
There are alternative tools for interpreting the growth evidence
that can help avoid such pitfalls. One is growth diagnostics, which
seeks to identify the binding constraints on growth faced by
particular countries at particular points in time. Another is
nonparametric econometric tools, which can be used to
understand the growth evidence without imposing the
straitjacket of assuming linear relationships.
The conclusions derived from such tools are considerably
different from those generated by standard methods. Most
importantly, these methods allow us to construct a picture of
the world that is consistent with its inherent complexity. The
illusion of certainty provided by conventional exercises no
longer prevails. But there is not much defence of such an
illusion if it leads to grossly inaccurate policy conclusions,
such as assuming that you will fall off a cliff if you try to
circumnavigate the world.
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